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Volume 3

To resolve this issue, the court applied basic rules of statutory
construction. After finding that the Special Act's plain language was
vague, the court analyzed the legislative history. Noting that the
Special Act was not intended as a 'blanket law,' the court found the
Special Act was "specially tailored to meet the needs of Bristol, as
opposed to any other municipality in the state." Thus, the court found
that it was plain "from the legislative history that the legislature
contemplated that Bristol would have such statutory authority" to
condemn property easements necessary to satisfy the Consent Order's
Bristol's
requirements. Disallowing
testing and monitoring
condemnation proceedings against Reynolds would be directly
contrary to the Special Act's legislative purpose.
The court concluded Bristol acted within the scope of the Special
The court also found that Bristol followed the proper
Act.
proceedings necessary to condemn Reynolds' property. Therefore,
the court refused to enjoin Bristol's condemnation proceedings
against Reynolds.
Michael Fischer

FLORIDA
City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund, Nos. 93,821, 1999 WL 731654 (Fla. Sept. 9,
1999) (holding that dredging of submerged lands did not constitute a
"permanent improvement" under the Butler Act and divestiture of title
in State submerged lands did not occur).
In 1947, the City of West Palm Beach ("City") obtained a building
permit under the Butler Act ("Act") and its predecessor the Riparian
Rights Act. The Act divested the state's title to submerged lands if
upland owners constructed improvements. The Act's purpose was to
encourage the state's waterfront development. The City constructed a
municipal marina on the submerged land of Florida's sovereign land.
The City also dredged a boat basin in the area surrounding the piers.
Ten years later the legislature repealed the Act, however, it confirmed
title for all upland riparian owners who bulk-headed or filled in or
permanently improved the submerged land before the Act's repeal.
In 1994, the City sued to quiet title to the twenty-six acres of
submerged lands around the marina including the dredged
bottomlands. The Board of Trustees conceded that the City was
entitled to title for the land under the docks, but contested the action
regarding title for the dredged bottomlands. The trial court entered
summary judgment for the Board of Trustees and concluded that the
dredging of the bottomlands did not constitute a permanent
improvement under the Act. The appellate court reversed and
granted a rehearing on which they affirmed the trial court order for
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summary judgment.
The issue the Supreme Court of Florida faced on appeal was
whether the City's dredging of submerged bottomlands in the vicinity
of the marina's piers had permanently improved the land under the
language of the repealed Act thus vesting tite to the dredged
submerged lands in the City. The court held that the legislature in
enacting the Act did not intend for dredging of submerged
bottomlands to constitute a permanent improvement subject to
divestiture of tide in state submerged lands.
The court construed the Act in favor of the sovereign state and
examined the Act's plain language. The court noted specific language
in the statute regarding an owner's exclusive right only over parcels of
submerged land on which wharves were built or the land filled in by
construction of warehouses, dwellings or other buildings. It found this
specific language to limit later language in the statute dealing with
land actually bulk-headed, filled in, or permanently improved. Thus,
permanent improvement occurred by building significant structures
like wharves, warehouses, dwelling, buildings, and other permanent
structures.
In reaching its conclusion, the court disapproved of the suggestion
made in the two cases the City presented arguing that dredging of
bottomlands constituted a permanent improvement.
The court
applied the strictly construed language of the Act to the City's facts
and found that dredging did not permanently improve the land. The
court affirmed the decision of the appellate court and held that title to
the submerged lands remained with the Board.
Karen McTavish

Tewksbury v. City of Deerfield Beach, No. 98-2673, 1999 WL 741109
(Fla. App. 4 Dist. Sept. 17, 1999) (holding that an outdoor dining
dock stretching over privately owned submerged lands is not a proper
exercise of dock owner's littoral rights).
Seeking compensation for the use of private land, the owners of
submerged lands ("Kesters") sued the Cove Restaurant and Marina
("Restaurant") which had built an outdoor dining area on a dock. The
dock supporting the Restaurant was located above the Kesters'
submerged land. Because the sovereign usually owns submerged
lands, this case was unique. In this case, the sovereign's only interest
in the submerged lands was an easement the Kesters previously
granted to the United States government to widen the Intracoastal
Waterway. The Restaurant sought a declaration that the use of this
dock was within their littoral rights. The district court of appeal held
that the Kesters owned a fee simple interest in the submerged lands,
and that the only issue on remand should be the scope of the
Restaurant's littoral rights.

